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I. Introduction
Globalization is progressing all over the world, which means that the market
expands and integrates economic activities beyond national boundaries in the pursuit
of greater efficiency. Above all, since the end of the Cold War, various attempts
have been made to integrate global markets more comprehensively. Furthermore,
these attempts have been linked with a movement to reduce the constraining impact
of national boundaries as far as possible and even to eliminate those boundaries en-
tirely where possible.
However, in recent years, some distortions caused by such integrative move-
ments have become obvious. In particular, as an apparent economic deadlock begins
to grow, more xenophobic forms of nationalism have emerged, for example, in Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, France, as well as in the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Denmark, leading to a call to reconsider multicultural and immigration policies,
symbolized in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s remark that “multiculturalism
has totally failed.” In recent years, it is also noticeable that relatively large-scale so-
called “national minorities” such as those in Scotland, Flanders, and Catalonia are
actively seeking to withdraw from their particular national political institution
(nation-state). Furthermore, it is plausible to say that the issues of “Brexit” or the
“Trump Phenomenon” in the United States, and the emergence of right-wing popu-
lism in Europe, are an extension of these socio-political trends.
In my opinion, this emerging momentum, involving an increasingly chauvinis-
tic nationalism and a retreat from tolerant multiculturalist policies, can be seen as a
consequence of advancing world-wide neo-liberal globalization. More than half-a-
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century ago, Karl Polanyi argued in his The Great Transformation that one of the
underlying causes of World War II had been “protectionism,” arising as an inevita-
ble consequence of more open borders that had begun to develop from the late 19th
century on. As the domestic economic structure of a particular country changes due
to more open borders, an opposition campaign inevitably develops to address the
subsequent destabilizing effects. Polanyi called this response the “self-protection of
society” (Polanyi 2001). Although his arguments related to “globalization” at the be-
ginning of the 20th century, a situation similar to the one he described can be read-
ily seen in relation to the early 21st century. Assuming the comparison is apt, it ap-
pears that the more barriers are lowered between countries to promote the freer
movement of goods and services, the more negative the consequences can be, lead-
ing to a form of “self-protection of society,” involving, at least in part, xenophobic
and defensive nationalism (see Hage 2003).
I believe that an effective response to such “self-protection of society” trends in
the world is to allow national economies and nation-states to be regenerated in an
appropriate manner. Various scholars, especially economists (see Reich 2012; Rodric
2011; Stiglitz 2012; Todd 2008), have raised many concerns about more open bor-
ders. Nonetheless, the apparently developing global trend is still towards even more
open borders and a post-nation-states system, and it has been claimed that globaliza-
tion and the end of nation-states are to be the “fate” of the world (see Gamble
2000).
However, before we accept such a doctrine of “fate,” it is important to step
back from this faith in the inevitable advance of globalization, to look at the influ-
ences and consequences of globalization calmly, and to examine the significance of
the nation-states system, namely “multi-nationalism,” normatively. From this per-
spective, I have defended the validity of another liberal conception of world order in
which diverse nations can have a separate and fair existence, and have argued that
regenerating national economies and nation-states in an appropriate manner and en-
suring that effective social justice and social welfare systems are functioning would
be necessary conditions for the implementation of successful policies of multicul-
tural tolerance (see Shirakawa 2012, 2014).
The philosophy at the core of this kind of conception of world order is the idea
of “self-determination,” that people should determine their own destinies and that a
nation is such a group of people who aspire to self-determination. However, an is-
sue arises in relation to nations that lack the capacity for self-determination, due to
various circumstances, even if they seek autonomy, and indeed many nations cannot
enjoy self-determination. One of the reasons underlying the possibility for a fair ter-
ritorial division of nations lies in the possible compatibility between a position that
respects the self-determination of other nations and a particular nation’s own self-
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determination. In other words, the justification of a particular nation’s self-
determination depends on other nations also having their self-determination re-
spected. Therefore, if nations want to enjoy their own self-determination, they must
be prepared in some way to facilitate conditions necessary to aid other nations that
cannot enjoy self-determination. In other words, the logic of this situation creates a
problem concerning transnational assistance obligations (duties of global justice).
In response to such a problem, what kind of normative conception of global
justice can be derived, in terms of emphasizing the self-determination of nations?
Concerning arguments about the foundations of transnational duties of assistance,
for example, some theorists have developed the idea of “liberal cosmopolitanism,”
which re-interprets and applies John Rawls’s theory of justice at the global society
level, while other theorists have developed “Kantian cosmopolitanism,” which is ori-
ented towards a global implementation of so-called “negative duties” (which are re-
lated to the “global harm principle”), but these arguments are not readily compatible
with the idea of national self-determination (see Shirakawa 2015). Rather, it is
among theorists of “liberal nationalism,” particularly in the work of one of its repre-
sentative figures, David Miller, that discussion based on obligations of justice ex-
tending beyond national boundaries is derived from a position that emphasizes the
self-determination of nations.
One of the central assertions of liberal nationalism concerning social justice is
that, to realize equality in society, there must be a “sensitivity,” involving a sense of
trust or solidarity, which is based on the sharing of a “national culture” among
members of the society. It is due to this “sensitivity,” that is, to a specific set of af-
fections and emotional ties, that each member of a particular society can regard a
framework of social justice as “ours,” giving that framework positive support and
remaining sustainably attached to it. Therefore, liberal nationalists, including Miller,
typically argue that as national cultures differ, conceptions of social justice also dif-
fer, and so it would be appropriate that conceptions of social justice be pluralistic
and distinctive.
Theorists who advocate for versions of so-called “cosmopolitanism” often ar-
gue that liberal nationalists, who have a culturally distinctive idea of social justice,
lack a firm theoretical basis to their conception of global justice, which I consider to
be a misguided criticism. In response to such criticism, as we will see in the follow-
ing, Miller (2007) distinguishes between domestic “social justice” and external
“global justice” in principle, and he grounds the foundation of the duties of “global
justice” in ensuring “basic human rights.” In his understanding, international society
as a whole has obligations to deal together with matters infringing “basic human
rights” that anyone on Earth should be able to enjoy, and, in this sense, he argues
for a certain form of “weak cosmopolitanism.”
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I agree to some extent with Miller’s account of social justice and global justice
as involving different conceptions in principle. I also sympathize with his account of
“weak cosmopolitanism.” However, I am less persuaded by the logic through which
Miller derives the concept of “weak cosmopolitanism.” My objection relates to a
perceived incongruity in Miller’s position in that he only appeals to “basic human
rights” as an objective and abstract principle when he argues for a foundation in re-
lation to the duties of global justice.
One of the central claims of liberal nationalism is that, since an interpretation
of the principles of justice differs for each nation, then principles of justice in this
context do not function stably and sustainably based on a “rationality” or on an ob-
jective and abstract principled foundation, but rather rely on appeals to “sensitivity,”
involving emotional ties among fellow citizens or their co-national solidarity. Given
this perspective, in my view it follows that a conception of global justice will not
work sustainably unless motivated not by some abstract and universal principle like
“human rights” but by some type of “sensitivity.” Miller does not argue for an
“emotional motivation” for global justice, and, consequently, his idea of global jus-
tice is less inherently derived from the justice arguments of liberal nationalism the-
ory.1)
In the following discussion, I aim to clarify the theoretical gap within Miller’s
account of different principles in relation to social justice and global justice, and
that, therefore, his idea of global justice is less inherently derived from the justice
arguments of liberal nationalism theory. I will then attempt to complement and mod-
ify his argument by referring to Richard Rorty’s insights, especially his concept in-
volving “sympathy” for others’ suffering as an emotional motivation for global jus-
tice. This line of thinking will provide a means to set out a normative theory of jus-
tice between nations in a multinational world.
──────────────────────────────────────────
1 ) I have criticized Yael Tamir, another representative liberal nationalist, on the same score,
especially contesting her idea of “multinationalism” (see Shirakawa 2009, 2012: ch.7).
Tamir’s arguments on social justice are similar to Miller’s, and she also highlights the im-
portance of a “feeling of relatedness” to motivate a principle of social justice (Tamir 1995).
Nonetheless, when referring to regional (transnational) political and economic institutions of
“multinationalism,” she does not mention an emotional motivation at all in support of these
institutions, although in these institutions there would be substantial exchanges of goods be-
tween particular nations that presume well-founded support for these exchanges. In my
view, she is not coherent as a liberal nationalist in not applying an emotional component to
her discussion here.
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II. David Miller’s Theory of Global Justice:
A Principled Distinction between Social Justice and Global Justice
1. “Nationality” as a Foundation of Social Justice
Miller’s primary research interest concerns exploring a normative principle of
social justice in relation to defending market socialism. Miller develops his own ar-
gument while discussing the problem of so-called “liberal” theories of social justice
(including libertarian ones), for example, Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Among his
various critiques, what I take as significant is his argument that liberal theorists tend
to lose sight of the problem of “motivation” as a ground for social justice. As he
says,
It is no use viewing government as a benign perpetual motion machine that
will turn out whichever policies we deem to be appropriate. We must give
some account of the human agents who have in practice to turn its wheel (who
they are, how they are related, what motivates them) (Miller 1989 b: 227 (ital-
ics added)).
For Miller, what motivates people to take duties of social justice seriously is a
communal tie, indeed, a shared sense of national identity or “nationality.”2) For re-
distribution policies to work well, as he insists, people must be bonded by a com-
mon emotional tie, that is, by a strong common-felt sense of belonging to their na-
tion. Unless there is already a strong sympathy for poor and unfortunate people in a
society, a redistribution of goods in that society is unlikely to function satisfactorily.
According to him,
Trust assumes particular importance if we ask about the conditions under which
individuals will give their support to schemes of social justice, particularly
schemes involving redistribution to those not able to provide for their needs
through market transactions. States which in this sense aim to be welfare states
and at the same time to win democratic legitimation must be rooted in commu-
nities whose members recognize such obligations of justice to one another
(Miller 1995: 93).
Here I should emphasize that Miller seeks a motivation for social justice within
──────────────────────────────────────────
2 ) Miller has already argued in his Social Justice, published in 1976, that an egalitarian con-
ception of justice works only in a community maintaining a relationship of intimacy and
solidarity among its members (Miller 1976: 334).
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a certain “sensitivity,” such as in “sympathy” for others who are in unfortunate cir-
cumstances or in a sense of “trust” and “fellow-feeling” between co-nationals. This
is in stark contrast with, for example, Rawls’s account of the “two principles of jus-
tice.” For Rawls, principles of justice are chosen by individuals as pure agents of
choice behind a “veil of ignorance” using “rationality” (see Rawls 1971; see also
Shirakawa 2012: ch.1). According to Miller, in order for there to be not only a vi-
able conception of social justice, but a political framework that enables social coop-
eration to work well, what is required is a “social” institution “whose principles
must accommodate natural sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth,
and which must rely on a complex set of motives to get people to comply with its
requirements - motives such as love, pride, and shame as well as purely rational
conviction” (Miller 1995: 58 (italics added)).3)
As Miller argues, for the moment it is not possible to express such “sensitivity”
other than through belonging to a nation. He cites the existence of “public culture”
including common meanings and understandings that form essential backgrounds for
a principle of social justice. “Public culture” is “a set of understandings about how a
group of people is to conduct its life together” (Miller 1995: 26) and “a set of ideas
about the character of the community which also helps to fix responsibilities”
(Miller 1995: 68). Therefore, it can be said that “public culture” is a set of feelings
and social meanings involving shared experiences without necessarily requiring con-
scious reflection, and, as such, it may provide a clue for exploring a plausible con-
ception of social justice. The possession of this public culture is said to be a feature
of the community called a nation.4)
──────────────────────────────────────────
3 ) Other liberal nationalists also emphasize that a principle of justice presupposes some emo-
tional connection among people who support it. For example, according to Tamir, a “con-
ception of distributive justice is only meaningful in states that do not see themselves as vol-
untary associations but as ongoing and relatively closed communities whose members share
a common fate. Within such communities, members develop mutual attachments that supply
the moral justifications required for assuming mutual obligations, without which the idea of
a ‘caring state’ is unsustainable” (Tamir 1993: 117-118).
4 ) Here I want to offer a brief overview of other features of a “nation,” mainly relying on
Miller’s arguments, especially taking into consideration differences from other entities. A
“nation” is “a community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-determining.”
Therefore, a nation is a group of people with a clear intention to decide their own fate who
want their own political institutions (states) to realize this intention. Furthermore, a “state”
means the set of political institutions that they aspire to possess for themselves (Miller
1995: 19). Other entities such as “ethnic groups” are distinguished from a “nation,” because
they require not political self-determination in a strict sense but appropriate recognition
from existing states (Miller 2000: 127-128; see also Kymlicka 1995: ch.2). In reality, al-
most all nations consist of several ethnic groups. From this fact, we can see that a national
identity is in principle compatible with identities that derive from other attachments, such as
ethnicity or religion. This means that nationality is, at least in principle, more ↗
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It is a feature of people sharing “public culture” that they belong to the same
nation and recognize each other as members of a culturally homogeneous group in-
volving continuous cooperation with each other in diverse everyday situations, to-
gether supporting what they perceive as “our” society. Therefore, according to
Miller, in principle, the basic unit of social justice must involve the nation and be
located within national units, for social justice to be best accomplished.5) Further-
more, since public cultures differ between nations, so do the interpretations of obli-
gations borne by members of particular nations differ, meaning that a conception of
social justice basically differs from one nation to another (Miller 1999 a: 18-19; see
also Walzer 1983).6) As Miller insists,
If we believe in social justice and are concerned about winning democratic sup-
port for socially just policies, then we must pay attention to the conditions un-
der which different groups will trust one another, so that I can support your
just demand on this occasion knowing that you will support my just demand at
some future moment. Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but
across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identification of the kind
that nationality alone can provide (Miller 1995: 140).
2. “Basic Human Rights” as a Foundation of Global Justice
Miller’s theory of global justice relies on the extension of a theory of culturally
pluralistic arguments for social justice, as discussed. Unlike advocates of so-called
“liberal cosmopolitanism” (or “Rawlsian cosmopolitanism”), for example, Brian
Barry (1973, 1999), Charles Beitz (1999 [1979]), and Thomas Pogge (1989), Miller
is opposed to a certain conception of global distributive justice through reinterpret-
ing Rawls’s “difference principle” to apply at the global level (see Miller 2000: 172-
174; Miller 2007: ch.2). He considers that a conception of social justice varies from
one nation to another. Therefore, enlarging the coverage of a principle of social jus-
tice, located properly at a national level, to a global level necessitates the imposition
──────────────────────────────────────────
↘ comprehensive than exclusive, because a “nation” leaves considerable room for particular
cultures to thrive within itself. Moreover, nationality is flexible, because its definition and
interpretation are always open to deliberation between co-nationals (Miller 1995: 44-46).
5 ) According to Miller, “the welfare state-and indeed, programmes to protect minority rights-
have always been national projects, justified on the basis that members of a community
must protect one another and guarantee one another equal respect” (Miller 1995: 187 (ital-
ics in the original)).
6 ) Therefore, in Miller’s view, for social justice to function stably, it is necessary to commit to
the nation-state more strongly than classical liberals have recognized (see Miller 1994: 159,
see also Miller 1989 a).
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of a specific national form of social justice onto other communities.7) On the other
hand, he does not support Thomas Nagel’s argument (Nagel 2005) that, since the
duty of justice only applies among those who act in the name of the people and
who are subject to the same sovereign power requiring the rule of law to be ob-
served, then in situations in which global sovereignty does not exist, a duty of
global justice cannot exist (Miller 2007: 276-279, Miller 2009: 30-31).8) For him, a
principle of social justice that primarily reflects the national culture of a particular
society and is appropriate only for the people belonging to that society, and a princi-
ple of global justice that is “valid across the different religious, moral, and political
cultures that we find in the contemporary world” (Miller 2007: 164-165) must each
be separately justified as normative principles. According to Miller,
Social justice and global justice are different concepts, and in order to under-
stand global justice correctly, we need to focus attention on the nature of rela-
tionships between people across the globe who at the same time belong to dif-
ferent national communities. But in saying this, I am not rejecting the idea of
global justice outright. On the contrary, wealthier states especially may be sub-
ject to quite demanding obligations for global justice, either to intervene to
protect human rights outside of their borders or to forgo some part of their bar-
gaining advantage in international negotiations in the name of transactional
fairness (Miller 2009: 30 (italics added); see also Miller 1999 b, 2000: ch.7,
2007).
Given this context, what could ground and justify a conception of global jus-
tice? Miller argues that it is the protection of “basic human rights” that “specify a
global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of justice, and
──────────────────────────────────────────
7 ) Miller criticized Beitz’s arguments in his On Nationality and insists on the following: “The
picture of international justice that I have sketched portrays a world in which nation-states
are self-determining, but respect the self-determination of others through obligations of non-
interference and in some cases of aid. This is very different from the picture presented by,
for example, Charles Beitz, who argues that we are justified in regarding the world as a sin-
gle scheme of co-operation, and who therefore conceives international justice in Rawlsian
terms. In particular, he argues for applying the Rawlsian difference principle internationally.
It follows from the Beitz position that states would have an obligation to accept outside
economic management in the event that this proved to be the most effective way of raising
the living standards of the worst-off members of the poorer states. In the present picture
there is no general obligation to help poorer states (Equally, of course, there is no prohibi-
tion on a state deciding to do this on humanitarian or other grounds)” (Miller 1995: 107-
108).
8 ) For Nagel, “the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera” (Nagel
2005: 115).
Shunsuke SHIRAKAWA４０
that therefore may impose obligations, on rich nations especially” (Miller 2007:
166). He then defines “basic human rights” in terms of “needs.” Thus, he distin-
guishes between “societal needs” and “basic needs.” The former comprise “the more
expansive set of requirements for a decent life in the particular society to which a
person belongs” and are “used to justify the rights of citizenship,” which guarantee
“someone’s position as a full member of a particular society.” The latter are “to be
understood as the conditions for decent human life in any society” and relate to the
necessary conditions for subsistence including, more concretely, food and water,
physical security, shelter, health care, and education (Miller 2007: 178-185 (italics
in the original)).
What is important here is that, according to Miller, “basic needs” are objective
and universal indicators for identifying what “basic human rights” consist of, which
are found “as the intersection of all sets of societal needs” and are also defined in
“activities that humans engage in that are reiterated across different contexts and ac-
tivities such as working, playing, learning, and raising families.” In other words, ba-
sic needs are “core human activities,” which are found in all human societies be-
yond differences of cultures, traditions, and ages among various groups (Miller
2007: 184 (italics in the original)). He argues that only these needs identify and jus-
tify “human rights by fixing on universal features of human beings that can serve as
a ground of these rights” (Miller 2007: 178).9) Therefore, “basic human rights”
grounded in “human needs” are the minimum rights that people in any society
should enjoy, with an implication that we have a “general obligation to support and
aid other human beings regardless of political or cultural boundaries” (Miller 1999
b: 179) in those societies that cannot guarantee these rights to their fellow citizens
for various reasons to do with poverty or conflicts, for example. According to
Miller,
I have argued, for example, against the cosmopolitan view that our responsibili-
ties to the world’s poor are in principle exactly the same as our responsibilities
to our fellow-citizens. We do not, then, owe them everything that we owe our
compatriots as a matter of social justice. In particular, whatever global justice
means, it does not mean global equality-of resources, opportunity, welfare, etc.-
so we are not required to change the global order in such a way that inequali-
ties between societies are levelled completely. On the other hand, I have de-
fended the idea of a global minimum that is due to every human being as a
──────────────────────────────────────────
9 ) Miller argues that human rights “identify forms of treatment that everyone is owed, regard-
less of what is happening to others,” and a person is entitled to have the rights “whether or
not other people are currently enjoying these rights.” Therefore, the principle of human
rights is related to “noncomparative principles of justice” (Miller 1999 b: 169-171).
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matter of justice, a minimum best understood as a set of basic human rights.
Since many societies are presently unable to guarantee these rights to their own
members, it appears that the responsibility to protect them may fall on outsiders
(Miller 2007: 231).
III. Critical Reflection
1. A Logical Inconsistency in Miller’s Arguments: The Problem of “Motiva-
tion” for Global Justice
As discussed, Miller adopts a dualist approach to explain how social justice and
global justice work according to different principles and grounds a principle of
global justice in “basic human rights” that must be universally guaranteed beyond
specific cultural contexts. Some critics have argued against him that social justice
and global justice should not be distinguished using different principles. For exam-
ple, in discussions concerning Rawlsian liberal cosmopolitanism, the reason the “dif-
ference principle” can be expanded globally rests on the assumption that the “origi-
nal position,” which Rawls hypothetically used when deriving the principle, is not
necessarily limited to a national society. Using an assumption of a global “original
position” allows for the same principle to be applied to individuals across nations
(see for example Beitz 1979; see also Shirakawa 2012: 38-41). Tatsuo Inoue has
also argued that “justice that can stop discrimination and corruption, that is, a princi-
ple of justice as a normative principle to criticize fraud” cannot fundamentally “stop
at being a national justice theory but has no choice but to be promoted as a theory
of global justice” (Inoue 2012: 19 (English translation by the author)).10) In short,
these theorists insist that, rather than presenting the argument as a type of “two-
story” theory that requires social justice and global justice to have separate princi-
ples as with Miller, a theory of justice needs to be “one-story,” involving a single
comprehensive principle for both national and global justice.
Whether to conceive a principle of social justice and one of global justice as
separate certainly seems to be a very important issue, and indeed it is one of the
main moot points in the “cosmopolitan-communitarian debate.” However, in relation
to a culturally distinctive view of social justice such as Miller’s, a principle of
global justice does not simply entail a globally expanded principle of social justice.
Therefore, when Miller distinguishes between two principles of justice and adopts
──────────────────────────────────────────
10) In addition, Pogge (2001) also makes the criticism that distinguishing principles of social
justice from those of global justice and “subjecting the global economic order to weaker
moral demands than any national economic order” is a “double standard.” However, I
should note that his criticism here is directed against Rawls’s arguments on “the laws of
peoples” rather than Miller’s arguments.
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dualism, this approach is not theoretically unreasonable, regardless of any normative
preference. Miller’s theory of global justice can be critically evaluated as his re-
sponse to the cosmopolitans to show that it is possible to provide a persuasive argu-
ment for global justice while defending a culturally distinctive idea of social justice.
However, what I consider flawed in Miller’s account is his attempt to ground a prin-
ciple of global justice in “basic human rights,” which are founded on “core human
activities,” while being satisfied with “basic needs” as objective and universal indi-
cators.
As discussed in section II.1, when Miller considers social justice, he focuses on
the “motivation” that underpins a principle of social justice. He proceeds to argue
that “motivation” is not a reason or an abstract principle, but a type of “sensitivity”
involving a communal tie and a sense of solidarity or trust among members of the
community. In my view, that is one of the central insights of liberal nationalism. In
other words, one of the core arguments of a theory of liberal nationalism is that, for
a stable and sustainable political framework of liberal democracy to exist, the moti-
vation and support of people who share a sense of solidarity or a sense of trust is
required. These sensibilities are brought about by a co-national sense of belonging
(“nationality”), which includes comprehensive social bonds arising from family rela-
tionships, social classes, religion, and ethnicity.11) Therefore, there is an apparent in-
consistency within arguments based on a theory of liberal nationalism, at least in
Miller’s case, because he emphasizes, on the one hand, an emotional motivation as
regards national social justice, but, on the other hand, does not engage with any
emotionally motivational aspects and only appeals to the abstract and objective prin-
ciple of “basic human rights,” in relation to a principle of justice within global soci-
ety (see also Se 2012: 144-145).
Miller might reject my assertion because he could claim that social justice and
global justice are qualitatively different, which means that whereas social justice is
an egalitarian principle, requiring co-nationality and a sense of solidarity as incen-
tives to encourage fair distribution of goods, global justice is not an egalitarian prin-
ciple and so does not require support through a particular sensitivity or emotional
motivation. Indeed, his conception of global justice is seemingly, in principle, a
minimum one that only guarantees the “basic human rights” of people, so it is a
“thin” rather than a “thick” conception of cosmopolitanism.12) However, as Miller
himself admits, on this “thin” conception of global justice, people, especially those
──────────────────────────────────────────
11) Margaret Canovan, who is regarded as a representative liberal nationalist, insists that na-
tionality is a so-called “battery” that makes the political framework of liberal democracy
stable and sustainable (Canovan 1996: 80).
12) The meanings of the words “thick” and “thin” are derived from Michael Walzer’s works
(Walzer 1994).
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in wealthy countries, need to be committed to “quite demanding obligations for
global justice” (Miller 2009: 30 (italics added)), involving a transnational relocation
of goods and resources. If this is the case, then for people to undertake and fulfill
any such obligations, a principle of global justice also needs support from people
motivated by some type of “sensitivity” rather than by a purely abstract and objec-
tive principle.
2. A Possible Motivation for Global Justice through “Sympathy” for Others’
Sufferings: Based on Richard Rorty’s Arguments
One of the reasons Miller grounds (or may have no choice but to ground) a
principle of global justice in an abstract and objective principle such as “basic hu-
man rights” is that he implicitly assumes that it is impossible to locate within an in-
ternational community something like a “sensitivity” that could support a principle
of global justice. However, this may not be necessarily the case. In the following
discussion, I highlight the possibility that “sympathy” for others’ sufferings can be
one of the “sensitivities” motivating global justice, but that is nevertheless qualita-
tively different from the “sensitivity” motivating social justice. Through this discus-
sion, I would like to modify and complement Miller’s theory of global justice.
Initially, I want to draw attention to arguments claiming that avoiding “suffer-
ings” and “cruelty” for human beings should be the first purpose of liberalism. One
representative theorist for this approach is Judith Shklar, who is known as an advo-
cate of “the liberalism of fear.” The political philosophy of liberalism, according to
her, has focused only on the issue of “justice,” such as would be involved with a
just distribution of goods, for example, and has not paid attention to “injustice”
(Shklar 1992). Therefore, she advocates “the liberalism of fear” to promote a “liber-
alism with cruelty as the first vice.” “Cruelty” is, in her understanding, “the deliber-
ate infliction of physical and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or
group by stronger ones in order to achieve some end,” and consequently, “the liber-
alism of fear makes a universal and especially cosmopolitan claim” to avoid such
“cruelty” (Shklar 1989: 29).
Poor and vulnerable people often suffer not so much from intentional actions
but rather from inadequately considered and even unconscious actions of other peo-
ple, especially those in rich countries. However, Shklar’s concept of “cruelty” is
limited to sufferings caused intentionally. Therefore, I would like to focus attention
on Richard Rorty’s arguments since he accepts and develops Shklar’s argument that
“cruelty is the worst thing we can do.” For Rorty, avoiding “cruelty” means not
only “causing no harm” but also “using no resources needed by those less advan-
taged,” which means his concept of “cruelty” is wider than that of Shklar and in-
cludes addressing unintentional sufferings caused by others (Rorty 1989: xiii-xvi).
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More significantly, Rorty argues that a “sensitivity” that perceives the “cruelty”
of others will be an important momentum to generate solidarity among strangers.
For him, “recognition of common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social
bond that is needed”; therefore, “what unites her with the rest of the species is not
common language but just susceptibility to pain and in particular to that special sort
of pain which the brutes do not share with the humans- humiliation” (Rorty 1989:
91-92 (italics in the original)). In other words, through sensitivity to “cruelty” that
people unknown to us suffer, we can sympathize and identify with them. In this
emotionally grounded process, we can think of other human beings not as “them”
but as “one of us.” As Rorty says,
Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing
our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, un-
familiar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to
marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as
we would,” or “There must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?”
(Rorty 1989: xvi (italics in the original))
It is neither irrational nor unintelligent to draw the limits of one’s moral com-
munity at a national, or racial, or gender border. But it is undesirable- morally
undesirable. So it is best to think of moral progress as a matter of increasing
sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger variety of people
and things (Rorty 1999: 81 (italics in the original))
For Rorty, cultivating one’s ability to sympathize with the sufferings of others,
which Annette Baier called “a progress of sentiments” (Baier 1991), leads to a cos-
mopolitan accommodation of “human rights” (in his words, “human rights culture”).
Therefore, he emphasizes the importance of a “sentimental education” (Rorty 1993).
Such sensitivity, according to him, could be developed not “by theory” but by get-
ting familiar with any source that “tells us in detail about sufferings which people
whom we have not paid attention to so far endure,” as is detailed in literature, arti-
cles written by journalists, movies, documentary dramas, and other areas of human-
focused creativity (Rorty 1989: xvi).
What I want to highlight is Rorty’s point that such “sympathy” for others
means being aware of even our “little, superficial similarity” (Rorty 1993: 129) with
others. Therefore, “sympathy” for the sufferings of others does not only recognize
differences among various groups but could be a basis for a “thin” cosmopolitan
sense of solidarity, which comprehends such differences. If this is the case, then
such sensitivity would not conflict with or supersede a co-national sense of belong-
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ing.
In my view, “sympathy for the sufferings of others” brings about a thin-level
consciousness of solidarity, while at the same time allowing for differences among
people. Therefore, such sensitivity could work to underpin duties of global justice to
improve the human rights of otherwise distant strangers.13) In other words, through
reference to Shklar and Rorty’s arguments, the duties of global justice within inter-
national society could be supported and motivated not by an abstract and objective
principle but by a certain “sensitivity” that is logically consistent with the theorizing
of liberal nationalism.14)
IV. Conclusion
In this article, from the perspective of motivations concerning global justice, I
have critically reviewed the theory of global justice of the British political philoso-
pher David Miller. I have pinpointed a theoretical inconsistency in his argument and
consequently tried to modify and complement Miller’s argument by referring mainly
to Rorty’s ideas concerning “sympathy” for the sufferings of others.
First, I provided an overview of Miller’s social justice theory and its relation to
global justice. For Miller, to realize social justice, a “sensitivity” involving a sense
of trust or a sense of solidarity based on sharing “public culture” is necessary
among members of a society. It is because such a sensitivity exists that people in a
society are prepared to consider a political institution embodying social justice as
“ours” and to offer affective support to it. From my point of view, one of the core
insights of liberal nationalist justice theory concerns the significance of emotional
──────────────────────────────────────────
13) Charles Webel and Sofia Khaydari try to ground global ethics in “non-violence” from a
viewpoint of the insights from peace studies and conflict studies (see Webel and Khaydari
2016). I believe that “non-violence” must be a highly sublime value, but based on my argu-
ments above, the sympathy for others’ sufferings and vulnerabilities must underlie the im-
portance of “non-violence.” In addition, such sensitivity also could be “narratives” for
grounding global ethics (see Salamon 2016).
14) Lynn Hunt, a historian of the French Revolution, reveals from a historical-sociological per-
spective that for a society to accept and accommodate the idea of human rights, it is impor-
tant whether this idea appeals to people’s emotions. According to her, the Enlightenment
philosophers at the time of the French Revolution had recognized this, and she insists, by
quoting an argument from Diderot, that without “interior feeling” shared broadly among
people in a society, they cannot really accept an idea of human rights. In other words, she
argues that “the claim of self-evidence relies ultimately on an emotional appeal; as it is con-
vincing if it strikes a chord within each person” (Hunt 2007: pp.26-27). I strongly agree
with her, and I think that if human rights invoke some moral duties towards others, this is
not because they exercise their influence as an abstract principle but because they have
struck the chords of people’s hearts.
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motivations that must underpin any principle of social justice.
On the other hand, Miller argues that the principles involved in social justice
are qualitatively different from those of global justice and that global justice is
grounded in requirements to guarantee “basic human rights” as a global minimum
for a decent life in any society. Therefore, he grounds global justice in “basic hu-
man rights,” while grounding social justice in co-national solidarity. From my per-
spective, these arguments seem to be inconsistent as arguments based on a theory of
liberal nationalism. Miller emphasizes, on the one hand, an emotional motivation as
regards national social justice, but, on the other hand, he does not engage with an
emotional motivation and only appeals to an abstract and objective principle such as
“basic human rights” concerning a grounding principle of justice within international
society.
Whether it takes the form of social justice or global justice, for justice to be re-
alized in a certain community, the members of that community are required to ac-
cept certain burdens or, to use a much stronger term, certain “sacrifice.” Jean-Pierre
Dupuy reveals that such a “circumstance of sacrifice” is not assumed in the argu-
ment of the Rawlsian theory of justice (Dupuy 1992: ch.4). However, in my under-
standing, liberal nationalists, including Miller, have argued correctly that it is not
enough to appeal only to rationality or abstract principles for people in a society to
accept such a “circumstance of sacrifice.” For example, Will Kymlicka argues that
History suggests that people are willing to make sacrifices for kin and for co-
religionists, but are only likely to accept wider obligations under certain condi-
tions. In particular, there must be some sense of common identity and common
membership uniting donor and recipient, such that sacrifices for “one of us.”
Also, there must be a high level of trust that sacrifices will be reciprocated: i.e.
that if one makes sacrifices for the needy today, that one’s own need will be
taken care of later. Liberal nationalists argue that national identity has provided
this common identity and trust, and that no other social identity in the modern
world has been able to motivate ongoing sacrifices (as opposed to episodic hu-
manitarian assistance in times of emergency) beyond the level of kin groups
and confessional groups (Kymlicka 2001: 225 (italics added)).
Therefore, an investigation is required to specify what type of sensitivity or
emotional tie would facilitate people in an international society to accept sacrifices
on behalf of distant strangers. I then argued, mainly in reference to Rorty’s argu-
ments, that cultivating “sympathy” for others’ sufferings could establish a sense of
solidarity with people who otherwise live at great distances and foster a perception
of “them” as “our fellows,” and that this kind of emotional motivation could under-
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pin a principle of global justice. By these arguments, I would hope to make Miller’s
arguments more logically consistent and compelling, based on a theory of liberal na-
tionalism.
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